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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1 Does American law and public policy reckon adequately  with the ways in 
which sharing and self-giving contribute to human flourishing?  I believe that it 
does not, and in this article I demonstrate how an American legal system rooted in 
social contract theories of liberalism is incapable of sustaining legal rules and 
principles that take seriously  social situation and dependency.  I argue further that 
the extraordinary deference American law gives to individual freedom can be 
particularly destabilizing to communities and legal systems that  place a high value 
on communal interdependence and social solidarity, and that this presents an 
important challenge to those who believe that self-giving membership in families, 
communities, and other social groups is essential to human dignity and 
flourishing.  As a way of demonstrating the seriousness of the problem, I describe 
how an ancient legal principle, in use around the world but only operative in the 
United States in the law of the State of Louisiana, was subverted by an American 
legal system and culture that was unwilling to embrace limitations on individual 
choice in order to promote communal ownership of goods and property within the 
family.  American culture does not understand the human person as an individual 
situated in community  with others, and basic principles of American law proceed 
from atomistic and utilitarian understandings of personhood that fail to recognize 
what Charles Taylor has called “irreducibly social goods.”1   Consequently, the 
social or communal value of collective goods tends to be lost and the value of 
such goods is judged primarily on their ability to enhance individual well-being.
¶2 In the United States, an individual has extremely  broad authority  over the 
disposition of his or her assets in a will.  In particular, adult children typically 
have no permanent claim on any  portion of the assets of their parents.  Until 
recently, Louisiana was the only American state that followed the civil law 
tradition of “forced heirship,” which creates a permanent forced share of an 
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1  See, CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 127-145 (Harvard Univ. Press 1995). 
“Something is common not just when it exists not just for me and for you, but for us, 
acknowledged as such.” Id. at 139.
individual’s estate in favor of his or her children, thus placing severe restrictions 
on a testator’s ability  to gratuitously dispose of wealth in a will or bequest.  For 
various cultural, economic, and historical reasons, Anglo-American families have 
long been more loosely structured than those in many  other parts of the world. 
This history, and a de-emphasis on the value of collective goods in American 
culture, has allowed Americans to accept rather easily a contractarian view of 
family relationships based on the willingness of individual members to be bound 
to the family  unit.  Consequently, there has been intense pressure to change legal 
rules that assume permanence in family  ties.  On the other hand, a unique cultural 
history within the context of the United States caused Louisiana to follow a 
different cultural pattern in which close extended family  relationships were 
normative rather than exceptional.  Although this family culture was fairly typical 
worldwide, over time, Louisiana was unable to maintain a legal norm at variance 
with broader American values, which led eventually  to significant limitations on 
forced heirship in Louisiana law.
¶3 This Article is organized into three parts.  Section II reviews the relatively 
narrow legal issue of the change in the doctrine of forced heirship  in the Louisiana 
law of succession.  For almost three hundred years, Louisiana law made it almost 
impossible for parents to disinherit  their children.  In 1999 a new law took effect, 
which allowed parents more freedom over the disposition of their estates once a 
child reached 23 years of age.  Louisiana is unique among the states in the United 
States in its maintenance of a mixed legal system, one which combines aspects of 
the civil law and common law traditions, and Louisiana’s law of succession 
follows the civil law tradition.  Although the Louisiana rule is found throughout 
the rest of the world, every  other American state organizes its inheritance law 
around the principle of donative or testamentary “freedom.”  Theoretically, the 
personal desires of the testator are superior to any claims that might be asserted 
against the estate based on a family relationship or public policy.2 
¶4 In Section III, I shall demonstrate how a devotion to an understanding of 
freedom that privileges personal autonomy in American culture created an 
environment in which it became impossible for Louisiana to maintain a legal rule 
that proceeded from a notion of communal obligation as opposed to personal 
choice.  Louisiana’s law of succession was able to function as an anomaly  in the 
American legal environment for as long as it did due primarily  to the state’s 
longstanding cultural isolation from the rest of the country, and from Herculean 
Winter 2008 No Bonds but Those Freely Chosen 2
Vol. 1 CIVIL LAW COMMENTARIES Issue 3
2  Eight American states, including the large states of California and Texas, follow the civil law 
tradition of “community property,” which gives a 50% forced share, or at least require the 
equitable distribution, of all property acquired during a marriage to a surviving spouse.  JESSE 
DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 397-98 (4th ed. 1998).  The common law does not 
automatically give spouses this right, but statutory law protects spouses’  interest in the marital 
estate in all other American states except Georgia.  Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the 
Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 121, 99-101, 136-37 (1994).
efforts by  certain members of the state’s political, legal, and social elites over the 
last century to retain civil law legal traditions.  Furthermore in Louisiana, unlike 
most American states, Catholicism was the primary influence rather than 
Protestantism.  Catholicism, which has remained a meaningful religious and 
cultural force for a large portion of the population, views the individual situated in 
community  as an essential part of the common good, whereas many Protestant 
traditions, particularly the Southern Baptist and Evangelical forms of 
Protestantism quite dominant in the American South, emphasize a highly 
individual relationship with Jesus Christ and the importance of personal salvation. 
Forced heirship  was eventually  undermined in large part by media appeals that 
employed constructions of personal freedom and choice that were grounded in 
popular American understandings of the common good that see it  as the 
maintenance of conditions that maximize the freedom to realize one’s individual 
preferences.  This vision was contrasted with the concept of long-term 
responsibility to others and the use of the authority  of the state to promote a 
particular vision of societal good, ideas with increasingly little appeal in the 
United States.  This atomistic American vision of personal freedom was simply 
too powerful for Louisiana law to continue to resist its influences, and the 
defenders of forced heirship eventually found it extremely  difficult to make a 
compelling case to the public.  In the cultural and economic homogenization that 
has been a hallmark of the post-World War II economic development in the 
United States and throughout the world, changes in forced heirship may be 
indicative of more significant changes to come to the Louisiana Civil Code, and 
may be yet another harbinger of the eventual disappearance of the state’s unique 
culture.
¶5 In Section IV, I will argue that the American understanding of individual 
autonomy, which has gained increasing acceptance in many parts of the world, 
will make legal rules rooted in a communal understanding of the individual 
difficult, if not impossible, to sustain.  The experience of the légitime in Louisiana 
may be particularly instructive to nations around the world that find themselves 
under intense pressure to modify their legal and economic environments in order 
to promote American-style capitalism and political liberalism.  Although changes 
in the law are often indicative of important changes in the culture, the law is also 
a vehicle for promoting cultural change.  As Mary  Ann Glendon has noted, the 
“rights laden public discourse” of the United States, “easily accommodates the 
economic, the immediate, and the personal dimensions of a problem, while it 
regularly neglects the moral, the long-term, and the social implications.”3 
Americans must ask themselves if they  are truly willing to live in a culture that 
roots family relationships in a libertarian vision of human autonomy.
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3 MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 171 (Free 
Press 1991).
II. THE LONG, DISTINGUISHED LIFE OF FORCED HEIRSHIP IN 
LOUISIANA 
A. The Legal Concept of Forced Heirship
¶6 With a legal culture rooted in the civil law tradition inherited from France 
and Spain, and a social history as much Latin- as Anglo-American, the indigenous 
culture of Louisiana has long resisted various homogenizing influences from the 
rest of the United States.  Yet  despite its uniqueness, or perhaps because of it, 
Louisiana has always been under relentless pressure to conform itself to the legal 
and social trends in the other forty-nine states.  For three hundred years, Louisiana 
retained a doctrine within its system of estate succession known as “forced 
heirship.”  The concept of forced heirship makes it extremely  difficult for a parent 
to disinherit a child because it  reserves a forced share of the parent’s estate, 
known as the légitime, for descendants in the first degree.4  A child entitled to a 
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4  Most recently, the forced portion of a parent’s estate was typically 25% if the parent had one 
child, or 50% if there were two or more children (who would divide the 50% share equally).  LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 1495 (LexisNexis 2003); Brashier, supra note 2, at 120-21. 
forced share can be deprived of that share by the parent only under very narrow 
circumstances.5
¶7 In the United States, forced heirship is generally juxtaposed against the 
common law concept of testamentary freedom, which is the key principle 
underlying the system of testate succession prevailing in most American 
jurisdictions.  Indeed, historical treatments of the development of the law of 
testamentary succession in the United States have noted that since the fifteenth 
century, “the emphasis in Anglo-American law has been on the right of the owner 
to choose rather than on the right of the family to share.”6   English colonists 
brought this disposition toward ownership to the North American colonies that 
would become the United States.  The common law developed a system of 
“separate property,” in which, for example, marital status did not necessarily 
affect ownership of property acquired during a marriage.  Ownership of property 
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5  The Louisiana Digest of 1808 drew twelve grounds for disinherison from Spanish law, which 
remained in place through subsequent revisions of Louisiana law.  Joseph W. McKnight, Spanish 
Legitime in the United States,  44 AM. J.  COMP. L. 75, 85 (1996).  The Louisiana Civil Code 
provided:
The just causes for which parents may disinherit their children are twelve in 
number.
There shall be a rebuttable presumption as to the facts set out in the acts of 
disinherison to support these causes.  The causes are, to wit: 
1. If the child has raised his or her hand to strike the parent, or if he or she 
 has actually struck the parent; but a mere threat is not sufficient.
2. If the child has been guilty, towards a parent of cruelty, or a crime of 
 grievous injury.
3. If the child has attempted to take the life of either parent.
4. If the child has accused a parent of any capital crime,  except, however, 
 that of high treason.
5. If the child has refused sustenance to a parent, having means to afford 
 it.
6. If the child has neglected to take care of a parent become insane.
7. If the child refused to ransom them, when detained in captivity.
8. If the child used any act of violence or coercion to hinder a parent from 
 making a will.
9. If the child has refused to become security for a parent, having the 
 means, in order to take him out of prison.
10. If the son or daughter, being a minor,  marries without the consent of his 
 or her parents.
11. If the child has been convicted of a felony for which the law provides 
 that the punishment could be life imprisonment of death.
12. If the child has known how to contact the parent, but has failed without 
 just cause to communicate with the parent for a period of two years 
 after attaining the age of majority, except when the child is on active 
 duty in any of the military forces of the United States.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1621 (1996).  Current Louisiana law contains eight grounds for disinherison – 
refusal of sustenance, neglect to care for an insane parent, refusal to ransom, and refusal to bond a 
parent out of prison have all been removed from the original list, and minor changes were made to 
the eight grounds remaining.  LA. CIV. CODE art. 1621 (2003).
6 McKnight, supra note 5, at 106. 
was based on a theory of title, which meant the property of a husband or wife, 
although acquired while married, belonged legally to the individual holding title 
unless purposely co-mingled or designated as jointly owned.7
¶8 This title-based understanding of ownership also supported a right in a 
testator to control property after his or her death.8  One benefit often raised in 
support of testamentary  freedom is that  it recognized a certain liberty interest in 
the testator to control the fruits of his or her labor over a lifetime.  This was a 
view that was well suited to the freedom rhetoric popular in the young American 
republic as it developed, particularly  during the 19th century, when tremendous 
amounts of individual wealth were generated and the nation expanded westward.9 
Indeed, as women have become more economically self-sufficient and divorce has 
escalated, this interest in personal control over the fruits of one’s labor remains a 
powerful rationale for the system of separate property in the United States. 
Another putative benefit of testamentary freedom is a certain coercive power it 
gives parents over recalcitrant children.  This type of power over others is not 
always exercised in admirable ways, but for better or for worse, the threat of 
disinheritance has long been understood in the Anglo-American world as an 
effective way to indicate displeasure with the behavior of one’s offspring.  Many  a 
child has been “written out of the will” for choosing a career, a spouse, or a 
lifestyle, that a parent found dangerous or offensive.
¶9 On the one hand, this freedom in a testator might be said to truly respect 
human dignity and personal freedom by liberating individuals from state-coerced 
obligations to bestow wealth on their children.  Arguably, voluntary  giving is a 
particularly authentic expression of the bonds of love and affection that we hope 
exist between parents and children.  On the other hand, deference to individual 
choice reveals how freedom of testation can foster a destructive sense of power 
over others and can nurture an understanding of familial bonds as conditional and 
revocable.  Although there will always be relationships between parents and 
children that  break down, should not the default position of the law be to assume 
intergenerational loyalty within families and to encourage equality and sharing? 
In American law, the act of disinheriting one’s child is given legal and cultural 
legitimacy  by creating a default  assumption that an individual may act as she 
pleases when disposing of property, even when she has direct descendants.  This 
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7 Id.
8 Deborah A. Batts, I Didn’t Ask to Be Born: The American Law of Disinheritance and a Proposal 
for Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L. J. 1197, 1219 (1990).
9 “The individualistic spirit of the pioneer country was unsympathetic to restrictions on ownership, 
as limitations on testamentary freedom were often seen.”  McKnight, supra note 5, at 105. 
However, McKnight also notes that the endurance of community property in certain parts of the 
American West indicates more sympathy for the idea of a marital community property among 
Anglo-American pioneers as they moved westward, perhaps due to the growing emancipation of 
women on the frontier.  Id. at 105-106.
suggests that it is not for the law or the state to assume that there is an appropriate, 
or socially preferable, way for a parent to treat a child when there is an 
inheritance.  Yet, why is the social or communal meaning of the relationship 
between parent and child any less deserving of support by  the law or the state than 
the promotion of freedom of action for individuals?
¶10 The concept of forced heirship  in the civil law can be traced back to 
Roman law and the laws of the Germanic tribes of Europe.10  Forced heirship 
draws on the longstanding tradition throughout various parts of continental 
Europe of the family forming a “community” in which assets are pooled.  Charles 
Donahue has described how, from at  least the 13th century, the idea of family 
community was integrated into the succession law of France:
Perhaps even more striking than the amount of control the woman 
had in marital property  is the amount of control the families of 
both husband and wife had in it.  Family  land could not be sold 
except for cause, and the family had what amounted to a right of 
first refusal in any sale of family land that came from its side. . . . 
In some areas this restriction also applied to gifts, in others, a 
system of légitime came to ensure that an heir would receive no 
less than one-half of what he would have received in intestacy; in 
still others no child could be favored to the detriment of his sibs.11
¶11 Over the centuries, the law in France and other countries on the European 
continent developed a regime of community property in which a husband and 
wife typically owned in equal shares all assets acquired during a marriage.12  In 
the United States the states that have chosen this rule have developed a very 
different theoretical understanding of marital property ownership.  In discussing 
community  and common law marital property regimes in the United States, 
Lawrence Waggoner has noted “how profoundly different  these systems are. 
Community property  reinforces a married spouse’s sense of participation in the 
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10 “The children’s right of légitime bears some resemblance to the claim of the heirs ab intestato in 
Roman law to challenge the will by a querela inofficiosi testamenti, and was considered by 
eighteenth century Scottish lawyers to have derived from the legitima portio given by the Lex 
Falcidia.  PETER STEIN, THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW: HISTORICAL 
ESSAYS 347 (Hambledon Press 1988); see also Thomas B. Lemann, Forced Heirship in Louisiana: 
In Defense of Forced Heirship, 52 TUL L. REV. 20, 20 (1977).
11  Charles Donahue, What Causes Fundamental Legal Ideas?  Marital Property in England and 
France in the Thirteenth Century, 78 MICH. L. REV. 59, 80 (1979-1980).
12 Id.
marriage and ownership  of the marital estate. Separate property tends to place the 
non-propertied spouse in a subordinate position.”13
¶12 The difference in these marital property regimes may also suggest socio-
cultural differences, and this is a critical factor to consider when assessing a 
similar divergence in the rules of testamentary  succession.  The concept of forced 
heirship  is logically consistent with the understanding of family community that 
prevailed historically in the nations that employ the rule.  A child born to a parent 
became a part of the community of the family.  Just as a spouse had a permanent 
claim on the assets of the community, so too did the child.  It is important  that the 
forced heirship provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code be read in this light.  These 
concepts come from a legal and cultural understanding of community  that was 
deeply ingrained in the French and Spanish colonists who came to the Americas, 
and that cultural context gives a richer meaning to the general rules and individual 
acts of testation.14   The légitime came directly to Louisiana from the laws of 
France and Spain, and it  remains a part of the law of these countries today.15 
Indeed, it is interesting to note that while Louisiana is unique in the United States 
in its use of the légitime, forced heirship  is the dominant legal practice throughout 
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13 Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 MO. L. REV. 21, 25 (1994).
For spouses in separate property states to operate as partners, the propertied 
spouse must decide to give ownership rights to the other spouse,  by outright 
gifts or by putting his or her earnings into a joint checking or money market 
account. . . . These rules, then, serve to reinforce the profoundly different 
symbolical and psychological feelings within the ongoing marriage.  Spouses 
are partners by right in community property states.  Spouses are partners, if at 
all, by the generosity or continued commitment to the marriage of the propertied 
spouse in separate property states.
Id. at 26. 
14 “Forced heirship recognizes that special link between parent and child that exists without regard 
to the age of the child.  It is not bound to the notion of support.”  Katherine S. Spaht et al., The 
New Forced Heirship Legislation: A Regrettable “Revolution”, 50 LA. L.  REV. 410, 416-417 
(1990).  “[A]s individuals we value certain things; we find certain fulfillments good, certain 
expectations satisfying, certain outcomes positive.  But these things can only be good in that 
certain way, or satisfying or positive after their particular fashion, because of the background 
understanding developed in our culture.”  Taylor, supra note 1, at 136.
15 In modern French law the freely disposable portion of a parent’s estate is one-half if there is one 
child, one-third if there are two children, and one quarter if there are three or more children.  The 
remaining portion is the légitime,  which, in the cases where there is more than one child, is 
divided equally.  French Civil Code (2005), Articles 913, 913-1, 914. Translation available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codes_traduits/code_civil_textA.htm#CHAPTER%20III%20-
%20OF%20THE%20DISPOSABLE.  Louisiana’s legal inheritance from France and Spain is 
properly understood as part of the Romano-Germanic tradition, also known as the “civil law 
tradition.”  “Within the Western legal tradition, the sub-tradition of the civil law is characterized 
by a particular interaction in its early formative period among Roman law, Germanic and local 
customs, canon law, the international law merchant, and, later,  by a distinctive response to the 
break with feudalism and the rise of nation states, as well as by the peculiar role it has accorded 
legal science.”  MARY ANN GLENDON, MICHAEL GORDON & CHRISTOPHER OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL TRADITIONS 40 (West 1994).
the rest of the world.16  In order to understand why  the légitime endured as it did 
in Louisiana it  is thus necessary to explore the state’s historical and cultural 
particularity within the context of the United States.
B. Louisiana as a Crucible of Latin- and Anglo-America
¶13 From 1699 to 1803, Louisiana was alternately a French and Spanish 
colony, the primary language of the inhabitants was French, and the laws came 
directly  from French and Spanish sources.17  In 1803, as a result of the Louisiana 
Purchase, Louisiana became a part  of the United States, but the bulk of the 
population continued to view itself as a part of the French New World.18   This 
perception was sustained by waves of immigration in the late 18th century from 
French-speaking areas such as St. Domingue (Haiti), former French colonies in 
Canada, and from France itself.19  For many decades after statehood, much of the 
local population did not actively seek integration into American life and through 
the early decades of the 19th century, Louisiana clung to the laws, language, 
religion, and social customs of France.20
¶14 Nevertheless, during these same years, Anglo-American settlers poured 
into Louisiana, and the state’s population expanded north and westward away 
from the New Orleans area.  Pressure to “Americanize” the state socially  and 
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16 See Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the Child from Disinheritance: Must Louisiana Stand Alone?, 
57 LA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1996).
17  For what is perhaps the definitive work on French Louisiana, see MARCEL GIRAUD, HISTOIRE 
DE LA LOUISIANE FRANÇAISE (LSU Press ed., 1974); “Spain legally possessed Louisiana from 
1762-1800, and she actually controlled the colony from 1769-1803. . . . But by and large Spain 
had little lasting influence. The French language, the French approach to religion, the French 
attitude toward pleasure, and French dietary habits remained dominant, and when the Spaniards 
had departed, it was almost as if they had not come.”  J.  GRAY TAYLOR, LOUISIANA 28 (Norton 
1984).  French culture won almost a total victory over the Spanish; it would encounter a much 
more formidable adversary in the Anglo-Americans.  Id. at 29.
18  Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., Creoles and Americans, in CREOLE NEW ORLEANS: RACE AND 
AMERICANIZATION 131, 141 (Arnold R. Hirsch & Joseph Logsdon eds., 1992).
19  The surprising tenacity of the ‘peuple français’  in the face of ‘la pression des 
populations americains’  appears to be due in large part to two unexpected 
developments after the change in sovereignty.  First, the expulsion of French 
Saint Domingue refugees from Spanish Cuba in retaliation to Napoleon’s 
invasion of Spain brought some 10,000 French-speaking persons to Louisiana in 
1809 and 1810. . . . Second, Louisiana continued to attract white French 
immigrants in the antebellum years in considerable numbers.
Hans W. Baade,  The Gens De Couleur of Louisiana: Comparative Slave Law in Microcosm, 18 
CARDOZO L. REV. 535, 580-581 (1996).
Discussing the transfer of Louisiana from France to the United States J. Gray Taylor notes, “[t]he 
people of Louisiana,  except for the relatively few Americans there, were not overjoyed by the 
change of masters.  .  . . [M]any devout Catholics feared that the Protestant United States would not 
allow them freedom of religion. In general, the people of New Orleans were not fond of 
Americans anyway.”  Taylor, supra note 17, at 46-47.
20 See generally, Tregle, supra note 18.
politically  increased.  The American arrivals were English-speaking and 
Protestant, and it  is hardly  surprising that they were unwilling to be excluded from 
social and political influence within the territory of the United States.21   In the 
years leading up to the Civil War, French speakers became increasingly  isolated, 
but the pre-existing Francophone cultural elite had enough influence to prevent 
the pre-American civil code from being swept aside by American common law.22 
The Spanish “parishes” were retained as units of local government, and 
notwithstanding the use of the common law for criminal law cases, the civil law 
regime adopted for the state was based on the Napoleonic Code.23
¶15 Furthermore, although many Protestant Anglo-Americans came into 
Louisiana during this time, other immigrants also flowed into the state.  As a great 
port, New Orleans received migrants similar to those arriving in other American 
coastal cities.  While immigrants continued to arrive from France and Canada, 
others also came from Germany and Ireland.24   Later, Italians, and Yugoslavs 
joined them.25  One significant fact about most of these immigrants was that they 
were Catholic.26  Unlike immigrants arriving in other parts of the United States, 
who were often met with anti-Catholic bigotry and social marginalization, New 
Orleans and Louisiana offered a city and state with an established, socially 
dominant, Catholic population.27
¶16 Ultimately, and particularly  after the Civil War, the state of Louisiana took 
on a certain dual identity.28  The northern part of the state became quite similar 
culturally to the rest of the American South – the white population spoke English; 
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21  For several decades after 1803 the history of New Orleans and Louisiana 
centered largely in vigorous battle among Latin creoles, Americans, and foreign 
French for control of the society, each group determined to mold the whole to its 
particular design.  Issues dividing the factions ran so deep that those involved in 
the contest not unreasonably thought of themselves as engaged in a struggle for 
the very soul of the community. 
Supra, note 18 at 141.
22  Symeon C. Symeonides, Introduction to the Romanist Tradition in Louisiana: One Day in the 
Life of Louisiana Law, 56 LA. L. REV. 249, 253-254 (1995).
23 Taylor, supra note 17, at 48-49.
24  Germans in particular, as well as small groups of Irish settlers, had been an important part of 
Louisiana under the French and Spanish.   German farmers are often credited with saving the 
colony from starvation in the 1720s and they were an integral part of colony’s white population. 
JOHN WILDS ET AL., LOUISIANA, YESTERDAY AND TODAY: A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE STATE 
23-25 (LSU Press 1996); see also Giraud, supra note 17, Vol.  V, at 266-267.  By 1810, there was a 
notable Irish presence, and ultimately, New Orleans became a major port of entry for European 
immigration to the United States.  Wilds, supra note 24 at 28-29.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Taylor, supra note 17 at 158-62.
was ethnically  English, Scottish and Scots-Irish; and was religiously Protestant.29 
The African-American population, made up  in large part of the descendants of 
slaves brought from other parts of the United States, was also primarily  Protestant 
and Anglophone.30  Immigration directly  from Europe to this area was minimal. 
South Louisiana, on the other hand, had a much more polyglot character, but its 
diversity was more ethnic than religious.31   Large numbers of European 
immigrants joined a significant population of American blacks, former gens de 
couleur libres,32 American migrants, and the long established white descendants 
of the French- and Spanish-era colonials.33  Apart from the American migrants, 
most of this population, black and white, was Catholic.  Much of the population, 
black and white, spoke French or a Creole French patois.34   These differences 
produced a deep cultural division within the state that had important effects on the 
political environment.35   Reconstruction, post-Civil War poverty, entrenched 
racism, and general social unrest gave the Anglo-Americans more social and 
political power, and once the Reconstruction attempts at racial equality collapsed, 
pressure became more intense to conform Louisiana’s laws and social practices 
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29 Id.
30 Id.
31 “Free people of color.”
32  These people are generally known today as Creoles,  and have been a significant group in the 
population of south Louisiana throughout the state’s history.  The virulent racism of late 19th and 
early 20th century American culture caused “white” Louisianans to assert that the term Creole 
applied solely to “pure white” descendants of Louisiana’s early European settlers.  This claim has 
generally been dismissed as ahistorical by modern scholars, and seems in retrospect to be an effort 
by certain New Orleans elites to “sanitize” the reality of a high tolerance for interracial intimacy in 
the culture of French and Spanish Louisiana.  The term “Creole” most correctly identifies those 
groups in the population that trace their roots to the Latin culture of the French and Spanish 
colonial experience.  What is particularly significant about the non-white Creoles is that they were 
francophone Catholics, sharing family names, culture, and lineage with the “white” francophone 
community.  This creation of a mixed-race, “creole” community was a common cultural 
phenomenon in the French, Spanish,  and Portuguese colonies of the Americas.  See generally, 
Tregle, supra note 18.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 On the importance of the North Louisiana/South Louisiana cultural divide in the political career 
of Huey Long, see generally, Taylor, supra note 17, at 158-162.
with the rest of the South.36   Yet, despite the pressure of ever-increasing 
Americanization, the state was able to maintain its civil law tradition.
¶17 Louisiana’s elites were primarily products of the southern part of the state, 
which was the main area of original colonial settlement, where most  of the largest 
cities were located, and home to most of the state’s people.37  Affection for the 
civil law, however, was not  simply a nostalgic peculiarity  of the upper-classes. 
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36 One prime example of the Anglo-Americans influence in Louisiana life after the Civil War was 
the transition from a more fluid system of racial relations and classifications, common in the 
Caribbean and Latin America, to a Jim Crow, black/white racial dichotomy prevalent in English-
speaking North America.
[T]he Americanization of New Orleans was more than just a struggle between 
Americans and creoles.  It also involved,  for nearly a century, the curious 
coexistence of the three-tiered Caribbean racial structure alongside its two-tiered 
American counterpart in an ethnically divided city.  Only the transformations 
wrought by massive European immigration, and a brutal Civil War assured the 
disappearance of the city’s traditional, if unorthodox, racial order. 
ARNOLD R. HIRSCH & JOSEPH LOGSDON, in CREOLE NEW ORLEANS: RACE AND 
AMERICANIZATION, supra note 20, at 189-90. Observers from other parts of the South were often 
shocked at the level of interracial intimacy in New Orleans.   Historian John Blassingame has 
written that the influence of Catholicism and extensive interracial sexual contacts created a more 
tolerant and nuanced racial atmosphere in 19th century New Orleans than in the rest of the 
American South.
Nothing is more indicative of the strange twists and turns which the color line 
took in New Orleans than the sexual intimacy between whites and blacks.  In 
this area, as in many others, Latin practices belied Anglo-Saxon ideology.  This 
is not to say, of course, that there was no painful discrimination against Negroes 
in public institutions and social relations. .  . . In New Orleans, as perhaps in no 
other American city, there were many cracks in the color line.  Negroes 
frequently interacted on terms of perfect equality with whites in public 
institutions and in social relations.  Jim Crow did not erect a monolithic barrier 
between the races; instead, race relations in the city presented a very complex 
and varied pattern of complete, partial, or occasional integration and intimacy in 
several areas. 
JOHN BLASSINGAME, BLACK NEW ORLEANS 210-211 (University of Chicago 1973).
37  In this Article, I will rely on an understanding of the role of elites that was developed by the 
sociologist Edward Shils.  Sociologists have defined “society” as “the outermost social structure 
for certain groups of individuals who, whatever might be their attitude toward it, view themselves 
as members and experience their identities as being determined by it.”  L. Greenfield & M. Martin, 
The Idea of the Center: An Introduction, in THE CENTER: IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS viii (L. 
Greenfield & M. Martin eds.,  University of Chicago 1988).  Shils uses the concept of the center to 
locate (1) the central system of values in a society and (2) the institutions and persons who 
embody the value system.  Id. at ix-x.   Generally, various types of elites occupy the center.  “The 
center exercises authority and power; it also espouses and embodies beliefs about things thought 
to be of transcendent importance, that is ‘serious.’”  Edward Shils, Center and Periphery: An Idea 
and its Career,  in THE CENTER: IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS, supra at 251.  Prior to 1803, and for a 
time thereafter,  Louisiana’s cultural center was occupied by a French-speaking Creole planter and 
commercial elite, and the Catholic Church.  By the Civil War, the Creole elite were being pushed 
aside by Anglo-Americans, and the Catholic Church was competing for influence with Protestant 
religious and cultural values.
There was strong grass roots support for the civil law in the Catholic south.38 
Many of the rural people in south Louisiana continued to speak French as their 
only language until World War II, and they were comfortable with the legal 
system being controlled by civil law-trained (and often French-speaking) lawyers 
and judges.39   Many recent immigrants, who were also concentrated in south 
Louisiana, were accustomed to living under the civil code tradition and saw no 
reason to change.40   History, language, religion, geography, ethnic heritage, and 
social customs all served to separate south Louisiana culturally  from north 
Louisiana, as well as from the rest of the South and much of the United States.
¶18 In the early  20th century a campaign began to introduce the common law 
device of the trust into Louisiana law.41  One possible use of the trust would have 
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38 See GEORGE DARGO, JEFFERSON’S LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL TRADITIONS 
11-19 (Harvard University Press 1975).
39  See generally, SHANE K. BERNARD, THE CAJUNS: AN AMERICANIZATION OF A PEOPLE 
(University of Mississippi Press 2003).
40  A popularized version of the idea that the “common man” in south Louisiana had a basic 
understanding and affection for the Louisiana Civil Code, and that New Orleans and south 
Louisiana existed as world apart from the rest of the American South, can be found in Tennessee 
Williams’ play,  A Streetcar Named Desire.  Stanley Kowalski, the male protagonist, is a New 
Orleans working-class everyman, with his Polish name immediately identifying him as a character 
foreign to the culture of the inland South (where his wife and sister-in-law are from), but integral 
to polyglot New Orleans.  When Kowalski begins to suspect that his wife may have inherited an 
old plantation property, he confronts her in the following exchange:
Stanley: Listen, did you ever hear of the Napoleonic Code?
Stella: No, Stanley, I haven’t heard of the Napoleonic Code.
Stanley: Let me enlighten you on a point or two.
Stella: Yes?
Stanley: In the State of Louisiana we have what is known as the Napoleonic 
Code according to which what belongs to the wife belongs to the husband also 
and vice versa.
TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, A STREETCAR NAMED DESIRE act 1, sc. 2, 22 (Dramatists Play Service, 
Inc. 1952) (1947).   This idea that the law should be accessible to all citizens was one of the 
purposes underlying the creation of the Napoleonic Code,  which was originally entitled, Le Code 
Civil des Français – The Civil Code of the French People – by Napoleon.
Indeed, a civil code should be so well-written – not drafted – that even the 
layman reader should be able to recognize that the legal regime described there 
conforms to and reinforces an order consistent with a proper understanding of 
the relation of human beings to each other in the ontological order consistent 
with the culture of the people and the physical environment in which they live.
Robert A.  Pascal, The 26th John M. Tucker, Jr. Lecture in Civil Law: Of The Civil Code and Us, 59 
La. L. Rev. 301, 302 (1998).
41  A trust is a mechanism for the separation of ownership of property from its beneficial use.  It 
rests title to the property in question in a trustee to use the property for the benefit of one or more 
beneficiaries.  THOMAS L. SHAFFER & CAROL ANN MOONEY, THE PLANNING AND DRAFTING OF 
WILLS AND TRUSTS, 99-100 (Foundation Press 1991).
been to exclude assets from an estate for the purpose of diminishing the size of 
the légitime.42  In 1920, legislation was passed to allow assets placed in trust to be 
exempt from the forced heirship laws.43   Devotion to traditional civil law 
principles was still so intense at that time that in 1921, the state constitution was 
amended in an effort to prevent future laws from being passed that would abolish 
forced heirship.44
¶19 The debate over trusts thrust Louisiana somewhat belatedly into a 
longstanding American debate about whether it was appropriate for a testator to 
exercise restraints on the use of property once it had been devised, also known as 
“dead hand control.”45   In describing the theoretical bias of American property 
law, Gregory Alexander has remarked:
The law of property is usually regarded as the province of 
individualism and autonomy.  It is certainly true that during the 
nineteenth century  the main doctrines of property  law, strictly  so 
called, favored the consolidation principle [which seeks to 
concentrate property rights and privileges in one legal entity].  And 
it is equally  clear that the consolidation tendency is consistent with 
the ideology of individual autonomy.  In this sense, then, 
nineteenth century  property law does reflect an ideological bias in 
favor of atomistic individualism and opposed to social 
interconnectedness.46
¶20 What was less clear, however, was whether the trust as a legal concept 
promoted or restricted individual autonomy.  On the one hand, if the conditions of 
the trust  were strictly observed, the trustor’s freedom of action regarding the use 
and disposal of property was protected and respected.47   On the other hand, 
restraints on the power of alienation restricted the freedom of the beneficiary to 
use the trust property as he or she saw fit.48  Although this tension was recognized 
by 19th century  American legal thinkers, Alexander has described how it tended to 
be overlooked or minimized as a reasonable exception to the ongoing process of 
liberalizing American property law and ridding it of “feudal” restraints on 
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42 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. 1984).
43 Pascal, supra note 39, at 315.
44 “No law shall be passed abolishing forced heirship or authorizing the creation of substitutions, 
fidei commissa or trust estates.”  LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16 (amended 1974).  The provision goes on 
to create an exception for the creation of trusts under certain limited circumstances.
45 Gregory Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1189, 1241 (1984-1985).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
alienation.49   Although liberal concepts of freedom and individual autonomy 
would ultimately prevail as the dominant ideology of American property law, a 
countervailing protectionist impulse was still quite visible in the nation’s legal 
argument during this time.50   Alexander calls these opposing visions “self-
determination” vs. “protectionism.”51   Within the perspective of 19th century 
classical legal thought:
The protectionist perspective recognizes that members of society 
have an obligation to care for one another, an obligation that does 
not derive from consent, express or implied, but from the fact of 
belonging to a social group. . . . The protectionist perspective 
approves the attempt to use property  as the foundation for 
connecting members of society, rather than separating them, as the 
Classical synthesis envisioned. . . . The protectionist perspective 
rejects the imperatives of self-reliance and self-determination.52
¶21 Louisiana’s jurists were not only steeped in a legal tradition in which the 
idea of family  community had been ingrained for centuries, they  were also the 
products of the slave and agrarian cultures of the American South, which were 
dominated by protectionist, hierarchical, and communal visions of social 
relations.53  Although this vision was distorted of course by the endemic racism of 
the period, many of Louisiana’s legal elites would have seen themselves as 
working to preserve a more “protectionist” legal and social order in the face of a 
liberal onslaught from the North.
¶22 In addition to this, by  the early 20th century the small farmers of north 
Louisiana were being influenced by the Populist movement.  Although some 
opponents of the trust may have been resisting the incursion of “foreign,” 
common-law structures into Louisiana’s Civil Code, others may have seen the 
trust as another tool of Northern corporations and banks that would be used to rob 
small farmers of their land and their livelihoods.  At a time when huge disparities 
of wealth were becoming more entrenched in American life, supporters of the 
légitime rallied around Louisiana’s alternative vision:
The most remarkable of the economic principles enunciated in the 
Civil Code, however, deals with the very current problem of the 
maldistribution of wealth and its unhealthy  accumulation. . . . one 
of the great purposes of the Code is the prevention of this disease. 
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49 See generally, Alexander, supra note 44.
50 Id. at 1241.
51 Id.
52 Alexander, supra note 44, at 1248-1249.
53 Id.
The strict provisions of the Code governing the right  of 
testamentary disposition, in the institution of the doctrine of forced 
heirship, and its elaborate provisions insuring equality  of heirs, all 
flow from the same desire of obviating the possibility of the 
passing of great estates into single hands . . . So primogeniture, 
entailment, trust, and every other form through which fortunes 
might be held intact despite death are interdicted by the Civil Code 
of Louisiana.  The agency of death thus performs its normal 
function: it releases the grasp of the possessor over worldly 
accumulation.  It distributes, vests ownership and the right of 
untrammeled disposition, breaks up the estate, and thus gives full 
play  to the natural rule expressed in the homely proverb that it is 
but three generations from shirt-sleeves to shirt-sleeves.  Thus the 
law does not stunt the natural instinct of acquisition nor interfere 
with the normal desire to accumulate for one’s own posterity.  It 
does not seek to confiscate nor to destroy.  It simply says to the 
individual: ‘You have no right to retain the dead hand on your 
fortune.’54
¶23 Of course, by itself the légitime did not necessarily address the problem of 
wealth concentration.  Although it may have dispersed wealth among individuals, 
this dispersal would occur within one family.  Here again, the importance of a 
protectionist and communal ethos becomes apparent.  In traditional social 
structures, forced heirship helped to maintain family wealth over the generations. 
If, however, nuclear and extended family relationships are weak, then forced 
heirship  arguably would aid in wealth dispersal.  In many  cases, jointly held 
assets could be sold for the highest  possible price so that siblings can go their 
separate ways upon the death of a parent.
¶24 The era following World War II began a new chapter in the story of 
Louisiana’s cultural and legal integration into the rest of the United States.55  Due 
in part to the growth of the oil business and a renewed influx of people from 
outside of the state that was precipitated by the war, pressure to change the rules 
and make them more consistent with the rest of the country mounted once again.56 
For the most part, the arguments for changing forced heirship were based on the 
idea that the free will and individual needs of the testator should control 
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54  Succession of Louis Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156, 1160-61 (La. 1993) (citing Joseph Dainow, The 
Early Sources of Forced Heirship in Louisiana, 4 LA. L. REV. 42,  68 n.134 (1941)) (quoting 
Sidney L. Herold, a delegate to the 1921 Louisiana Constitutional Convention in SIDNEY L. 
HEROLD, HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS FOR 1935, 84, 88-89).
55 Bill McMahon, Senate Oks Heirship Bill, THE ADVOCATE, June 6, 1995, at 1A.
56  Max Nathan,  Jr.,  Forced Heirship in Louisiana: An Assault on the Citadel: A Rejection of 
Forced Heirship, 52 TUL. L. REV. 5, 6 (1977).
inheritance decisions, and that the state of Louisiana was imposing an 
unreasonable burden on testators by  forcing them to leave substantial portions of 
their estates to their children.57   Support for Louisiana’s “unique” institution 
continued to remain strong, however, and the protection for forced heirship 
survived a subsequent revision of the state constitution in 1974.58  Yet, important 
economic and social changes were beginning to weaken its foundations.
C. The Successful Attack on the Légitime
¶25 The most recent and, ultimately, successful challenge to the légitime began 
in earnest in 1989.  Throughout the 1980s, bills were introduced in the state 
legislature calling for changes to forced heirship, and, in 1989, an act was passed 
redefining forced heirs as children under the age of twenty-three or those who are 
declared legally incompetent (interdicted) or subject to such a declaration.59 
Although perhaps not  a significant change in the eyes of those acculturated to the 
common law, this revision to forced heirship  represented a fundamental break 
with the ancient civilian tradition of the family  community.  A testator could now 
choose to sever a bond that the civil law had always recognized as permanent and 
unbreakable.  In the extreme cases where the civil law allowed for disinherison; 
the community, through the action of the legislature, determined the 
circumstances that justified the severing of basic social relationship.  What was a 
community-based standard had now become a personal choice, based on the 
desires of the individual testator.
¶26 There was some doubt, however, as to the constitutionality of the act  under 
the revised Louisiana Constitution of 1974.60   Indeed, in 1993 it  was ruled 
unconstitutional by  the Louisiana Supreme Court in The Succession of Lauga.61 
The case made it clear that the only way to modify  forced heirship was to repeal 
the constitutional amendment that had been drafted to protect forced heirship 
from just this sort of legislative attack, something that could only be done by 
popular vote.  Thus, a huge public relations campaign began in the mid-1990s to 
repeal the amendment.
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58 In 1974, Article XII, Section V replaced the 1921 provision.  The replacement Articles stated: 
“No law shall abolish forced heirship.  The determination of forced heirs, the amount of the forced 
portion, and the grounds for disinherison shall be provided by law. Trusts may be authorized by 
law, and a forced portion may be placed in trust.”  L.A. CONST. art.  XII, § 5 (amended 1996).  M. 
Kelly Lanning Turner, Recent Developments: Succession of Louis Lauga: Amendments to Forced 
Heirship Article Violate Louisiana Constitution, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1390, 1395 (1994).
59 1989 La. Acts 788.
60 For a detailed analysis of the constitutionality of the act, see Spaht, supra note 15.
61 Succession of Louis Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993).
¶27 As early as the late 1970s, intense academic debates had taken place over 
the continued viability  of forced heirship in Louisiana.  In one often cited 
exchange from 1977, Max Nathan and Thomas Lemann presented two contrasting 
views.62  Nathan argued that forced heirship  was unsound both in principle and in 
practice, noting that it was essentially a “primitive kind of socialism,” and 
describing various ways in which the principle was unsuited to modern life.63  In 
particular, he contended that (1) state and federal estate taxes made forced 
heirship  unnecessary as a means of breaking up large concentrations of wealth; 
(2) the geographic mobility of society and the fact that all of the other states in the 
United States did not use forced heirship made Louisiana’s interest in the policy 
less compelling; (3) even within Louisiana, various methods (such as inter vivos 
transfers) existed to allow testators to avoid forced heirship; and (4) forced 
heirship  placed unreasonable burdens on a surviving spouse by limiting his or her 
portion of the marital estate in favor of the children, and this circumstance was 
particularly burdensome for surviving spouses in second marriages.64  Throughout 
the article, Professor Nathan was critical of what he believed to be an illogical 
attachment to the past in the retention of forced heirship.65   He concluded by 
arguing for respect for a testator’s judgment about distribution of assets as 
opposed to reliance on the state:
[W]hen a parent cares enough to write a will, the parent more often 
than not will know better how to dispose of his property than will 
the state by imposing an inflexible blanket rule.  In other words, 
while most testators will probably want to preserve equality of 
heirship, in any given situation the parent himself will generally 
know better how to distribute his property  among his heirs than 
does the state by making inalterable rules that apply virtually  to 
everyone . . . There is no reason to be afraid of changing forced 
heirship simply because it has a long and extensive history.66
¶28 Lemann replied to Nathan’s criticisms of forced heirship  by noting that  (1) 
most common law jurisdictions also had forms of testamentary restrictions that 
prevented one spouse from disinheriting the other; (2) that forced heirship was an 
ancient principle did not make it obsolete but suggested, on the contrary, that the 
principle was rooted in certain human truths that have endured despite changing 
social, political, and economic conditions; (3) geographic mobility and the 
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62  Max Nathan,  Jr.,  Forced Heirship in Louisiana: An Assault on the Citadel: A Rejection of 
Forced Heirship, 52 TUL. L. REV. 5, 6 (1977).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 7-14.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 19.
changing nature of wealth do not make the social, moral, and civic principles 
underlying forced heirship any  less compelling than they have been in the past; 
and (4) the practical and technical problem that have arisen in succession law can 
be dealt with through judicial or legislative modifications without abandoning 
forced heirship altogether.67
¶29 By the time the media campaign ensued in the mid-1990s to convince the 
state’s voters to reject forced heirship, it was clear that Prof. Nathan’s arguments 
had gained the upper hand.  The media debate demonstrated how foreign the 
cultural concepts underlying the légitime had become to the now heavily 
Americanized society  of Louisiana.68  Those wishing to eliminate forced heirship 
appealed to the voters as individuals with potential inheritance problems, 
problems easily solved if they voted for more testamentary freedom, while the 
supporters of forced heirship  relied on the less resonant concepts of heritage, 
time-tested tradition, and moral responsibility to children in order to make their 
case.69   The political debate was categorized in the press as one which pitted 
“property rights vs. family values.”70
¶30 Opponents of change attacked the attempt to eliminate forced heirship as 
“morally  repugnant”71  and defended forced heirship as a “‘finely crafted 
compromise’ between giving someone complete freedom to dispose of his estate 
and holding him to family responsibilities.”72  On the other hand, proponents of 
testamentary freedom assailed forced heirship as archaic, and out of step  with 
modern conceptions of the role of the state and with the realities of family life.73 
For example, the leading newspaper in Baton Rouge editorialized in favor of 
ending forced heirship by stating:
[F]orced heirship is an anachronism, preventing people who have 
worked hard all their lives from disposing of the fruits of their 
labors as they see fit.  The vast majority  of parents gladly spend a 
large part of their lives and their incomes rearing their children, 
and most parents will continue to provide for their children in their 
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67 Lemann, supra note 10. 
68  Kevin McGill, Forced Heirship Challenged, THE NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 19, 
1995, at A7.
69 Bill McMahon, Senate Oks Heirship Bill, THE ADVOCATE, June 6, 1995, at 1A.
70 Id.
71  Id.  at 1A (relating comments from State Senator John Hainkel (R-New Orleans) who voted 
against the amendment despite many calls from constituents in favor of the proposed change.).
72 Carl Redman, Amendment 1: “Rights” vs. Family,  THE ADVOCATE, Oct.  9, 1995, at 1B (quoting 
Prof. Katherine S. Spaht).
73  Randy McClain,  Heir Un-Apparent, THE ADVOCATE, Nov. 11, 1995 at 1C; see also, Senate 
Backs Vote on Forced Heirship, THE ADVOCATE, May 17,1995 at 6A.
wills.  But they should be able to do so out of love, not because the 
state tells them they must.74
¶31 The general consensus among many opponents of forced heirship was that 
its abolition would “sen[d] a loud signal that we are no longer this backward state 
that looks to the laws of our forebears as the way we want to propagate the laws 
of today.”75  The symbol of modernity that proponents of the change sought was 
not simply a statement against the “ultimate form of (government) intrusion—
telling people what they  must do with whatever money they have left after the 
government takes its fair share.”76   Rather, as state senator Ron Brun, a 
Republican from the city of Shreveport in Northwest Louisiana, articulated the 
goal: eliminating forced heirship expressed a willingness on the part of Louisiana 
to acknowledge the “modern” sentiment that “our children are entitled to our love. 
Anything else they can earn for themselves.”77
¶32 Given the history of Louisiana, it is no small point that this successful 
attack on forced heirship was accomplished through the political union of a 
powerful politician from north Louisiana where, historically, hostility to the civil 
law tradition was most intense, and a wealthy descendant of an infamous political 
family from south Louisiana, where support for the légitime traditionally had been 
stronger.78   Confronted with powerful political alliances and skeptical public 
opinion, the traditionalists were unable to hold their ground.  In 1995, the people 
of Louisiana voted to abolish the légitime for most descendants by ratifying an 
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74 Vote to Change Louisiana Heirship Law, THE ADVOCATE, Oct. 8, 1995 at 12B.
75 James Welsh, Heirship In Louisiana A Test of Wills, THE NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 
31, 1995, at C1.
76 Take Forced Heirship out of the La. Constitution, THE ADVOCATE, May 1,1995, at 6B.
77 Jack Wardlaw, Forced Heirship Laws Withstand Senate Challenge, THE NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, May 3, 1995 at A8.
78 Chalin Perez, whose family controls huge land holdings in oil-rich Plaquemines Parish in South 
Louisiana, hired a lobbyist and mounted a campaign against the légitime when it became clear that 
he could not disinherit the adult children of his first marriage in order to benefit the children of a 
second union.  James Gill, Forced Heriship and the Perezes ,THE NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, 
Jul.  2, 1989, at BB; Cynthia Samuel, 12 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 183, 185 (1997).  Chalin Perez’s 
father, Leander Perez was an arch-segregationist and the ruthless political boss of Plaquemines 
Parish for fifty years during the mid-20th century.  During the time he controlled the entire 
political mechanism of Plaquemines Parish, he amassed tremendous wealth for himself and his 
family through various legal and illegal means.  Wilds, supra note 24,  at 270-271; F. Marcus, 
Disinheritance Law Kindles Passion in Louisiana, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1989 at B7.
amendment to the state constitution.79   With this amendment, the légitime was 
limited to children twenty-three years of age or younger and the scope of forced 
heirship  was vastly reduced, with the amendment saying specifically that forced 
heirship  was “abolished in this state.”80   In 1997, the state legislature adopted a 
new, comprehensive law of successions, which became effective on July 1, 
1999.81  Why were the opponents successful this time?
¶33 Much of the opposition to forced heirship  was rooted in a highly  atomized 
vision of personal identity, as well as a strong libertarian strain in American 
culture that has long been hostile to communal claims on personal resources that 
are backed by the power of the state.  Additionally, the “archaic” view of family 
and wealth transmission attacked by the opponents relied on a conception of 
parenting that also is highly resonant in American culture, one that views children 
as a temporary responsibility to be discharged as soon as offspring become of age. 
Lineage, extended family  unity, and inter-generational responsibility, all essential 
cultural underpinnings to the concept of the légitime, were dismissed by many as 
anachronisms from an agrarian past.  This narrow view of the family, which I will 
examine in more detail, is a significant cultural difference between the United 
States and much of the rest of the world.
¶34 According to the 2000 United States Census data, Louisiana had one of the 
more stable populations in the United States.82   Although out-migration has 
always been significant, the percentage of its population born in the state is 
among the highest in the nation, and no state has fewer migrants from other parts 
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79 In 1996, the state constitution was amended to contain the following:
(A) The legislature shall provide by law for uniform procedures of successions 
and for the rights of heirs or legatees and for testate and intestate succession. 
Except as provided in paragraph (B) of this Section, forced heirship is abolished 
in this state.
(B) The legislature shall provide for the classification of descendants, of the first 
degree, twenty-three years of age or younger as forced heirs. The legislature 
may also classify as forced heirs descendants of any age who, because of mental 
incapacity or physical infirmity, are incapable of taking care of their persons or 
administering their estates. The amount of the forced portion reserved to heirs 
and the grounds for disinherison shall also be provided by law.”
L.A. CONST. art. XII, § 5.
80 Id.
81 See 1997 La. Acts 1421, 1997 La. Acts 3007.
82 Marc J. Perry & Paul J.  Mackun, Population Change and Distribution 1990-2000: Census 2000 
Brief, Report No. C2KBR/01-2 (April, 2001) available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/
c2kbr01-2.pdf.  Ten states had more stable populations than Louisiana during this ten-year period: 
North Dakota, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Maine,  Rhode Island, Ohio, Iowa, New 
York, and Massachusetts.  Id.
of the country.83   The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina has of course led to a 
dramatic increase in out-migration, but has also reinforced the image of the state 
as inhospitable to new migrants from elsewhere.  More recent data show that the 
population of Louisiana has declined.84  The relative high percentage of native-
born residents, combined with a singular history  in North America, has given the 
state a unique culture that draws tourists from around the world, but it  has also 
created an environment that has discouraged economic development and various 
modern legal reforms.   The maintenance of a legal system that is not entirely 
based on the common law intensifies this sense of distance, and has often had a 
chilling effect on economic investment from other parts of the United States.  In 
recent years, many cities in Louisiana have attempted to promote themselves as 
warm-weather retirement destinations in an effort to spur the local economy with 
money  from Northern retirees.85   Forced heirship raises many  issues for those 
individuals who choose to retire in Louisiana.86  Debates about the relative value 
of uniqueness versus economic growth have been a central part of Louisiana 
politics in the post-World War II era, with “modernists” seeking economic 
development sparring with “traditionalists” who sought to preserve the state’s 
unique legal and cultural heritage.  The view that the civil law tradition has 
hampered Louisiana’s economic development ignores the obvious examples of 
nations around the world that have moved into the modern economic era while 
retaining civilian legal systems, although to be fair it  may simply recognize the 
untenable position of an American state attempting to retain “foreign” legal 
traditions in a period of intense domestic economic integration and federal 
bureaucratic centralization.
¶35 As an integral part of the United States, it is not particularly surprising that 
Louisiana has been compelled over time to adapt to the broader legal and cultural 
realities of the nation of which it  is a part.  American cultural influence, however, 
is also quite pervasive beyond the borders of the United States, and the pressure to 
conform to American legal and cultural norms affects nations around the world, 
particularly as the United States asserts its status as the globe’s preeminent 
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83 Blaine Harden, Born on the Bayou and Barely Felling any Urge to Roam, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 
2002, at A1.
84 See U.S. Census Bureau: State and Country QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
22000.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2009).
85 See generally, “Retire in Louisiana” http://www.retirelouisiana.org/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2009).
86  See generally,  JOHN E. SIROIS, LOUISIANA RETIREMENT AND ESTATE PLANNING (Financial 
Publishers LLC 2007).
economic and military power.87   As the United States promotes its version of 
democratic government and free market capitalism, there is bound to be resistance 
to cultural values that are an implicit part  of this package.88  This is obvious to 
people around the world in ways that may not be obvious to many people in 
Louisiana.  It is not unreasonable to expect that there will be foreign resentment 
and resistance to certain hegemonic tendencies of American law and culture, if 
not outright rejection of the social costs and cultural assumptions of the American 
economic and political paradigm.89
III. FORCED HEIRSHIP - A WEED IN THE GARDEN OF THE 
UNENCUMBERED SELF
¶36 The rootedness of many of Louisiana’s elites in a cultural context heavily 
influenced by Catholicism may be another reason the légitime endured for as long 
as it did, and also sheds light on certain important differences between the Latin- 
and Anglo-American visions of the individual in society that were relevant in the 
development of succession law.  Catholics believe that the individual is inherently 
social, and that human dignity  cannot be separated from life in community  with 
others.90  This socially situated view of the human person was well established in 
Catholic theology by the time of French and Spanish colonial expansion into the 
Americas.  In the Louisiana Digests of 1808 and the Louisiana Civil Code of 
1825, substantive Spanish law was translated into French and English using the 
French Civil Code of 1804 as an organizational model.91   Robert Pascal has 
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87 In JOHN GRAY, FALSE DAWN (Granta Publications 1998), John Gray describes the United States 
as fiercely (and uniquely) committed to a project of universal civilization based on the global free 
market.  Id. at 100.   In the process, the United States is “detaching itself from other ‘western’ 
cultures in the extremity of its experiment in free-market social engineering.”  Id. at 103.
To accept that countries can achieve modernity without revering the folkways of 
individualism, bowing to the cult of human rights, or sharing the Enlightenment 
superstition of progress toward a world civilization, is to admit that America’s 
civil religion has been falsified. For most Americans such a perception is 
intolerable. Instead, evidence of superior economic growth, savings rates, 
educational standards and family stability of countries that have repudiated the 
American model will be repressed, denied and resisted indefatigably. To admit 
this evidence would be to confront the social costs of the American free market. 
The free market works to weaken social cohesion.  Its productivity is prodigious; 
but so are its human costs.”
Id. at 131.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 “For by their innermost nature men and women are social beings; and if they do not enter into 
relationships with others they can neither live nor develop their gifts.”  Pastoral Constitution on 
the Church in the Modern World,  Gaudium et spes, ¶12, in VATICAN COUNCIL II: CONSTITUTIONS, 
DECREES, RESOLUTIONS, 175 (Austin Flannery, O.P. ed., Costello Publishing 1996).
91 Pascal, supra note 39, at 302.
indicated that the general principles and norms underlying the Spanish law of that 
era drew explicitly on Catholic principles grounded in the idea of natural law:
The Digest of 1808, the Civil Code of 1825, and the Revised Civil 
Code of 1870 as enacted all defined ‘equity’ as an appeal to 
‘natural law,’ ‘reason,’ or ‘received usages.’  The text came into 
existence for us with the Digest of 1808, which, it is to be 
remembered, was a digest of the Spanish law in force.  It should be 
correct, therefore, to assume that "natural law" was assumed to 
have the meaning attributed to it in Spain, [containing] judgments 
about proper human order both consistent with Spanish culture and 
based on the understanding that all men ontologically-by  creation-
form a community  of mankind under God and, being a community, 
are obliged morally  to respect each other and to live and act 
cooperatively with each other for the common good.92
¶37 Even though the legal concept of a permanent, interdependent community 
grounded in marriage and the lineal family came to French and Spanish law from 
“pagan” Roman and Germanic tribal sources, this concept is consistent with the 
theology of the human person developed by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas that 
saw the love of others in community as central to an appropriate love of God.93 
The Church was intimately involved in legal rules relating to the family in Spain 
and pre-Revolutionary France, and would no doubt have been supportive of legal 
rules that recognized the permanence of marriage and family bonds.94   The 
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92 Id. at 308.
93  For a general discussion on the development by Aquinas and Augustine of the concept of 
Christian love as love of self in community with others, see generally, Gregory Baum, Theological 
Reflections on the Catholic Ethic, in JOHN E. TROPMAN, THE CATHOLIC ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF 
COMMUNITY 193, 198-199 (Georgetown 2002).  “Love of God and community summons the 
believer to be selfless and self-sacrificing, forgetting oneself in the worship of God and service of 
the neighbor, yet hoping that in this love one will find one’s own fulfillment, joy, and happiness.” 
Id. at 199.
94 Id.
centrality of family  remains an important part  of modern Catholic social 
thought.95
¶38 Notwithstanding the importance of Catholicism in its cultural life and its 
ties to Latin America, Louisiana today is fundamentally an Anglo-American 
place, integrally  part of the social and political currents of the greater United 
States.  More than anything else, it was the inability  of the dominant strains of 
modern American liberalism to embrace concepts rooted in permanent bonds or 
communal identity that destroyed forced heirship.  Michael Sandel has noted: 
[T]he liberal attempt to construe all obligation in terms of duties 
universally owed or obligations voluntarily  incurred makes it 
difficult to account for civic obligations and other moral and 
political ties that we commonly  recognize.  It  fails to capture those 
loyalties and responsibilities whose moral force consists partly in 
the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding 
ourselves as the particular persons we are-as members of this 
family or city  or nation or people, as bearers of that history, as 
citizens of this republic.  Loyalties such as these can be more than 
values I happen to have, and to hold, at a certain distance.  The 
moral responsibilities they entail may  go beyond the obligations I 
voluntarily  incur and the “natural duties” I owe to human beings as 
such.96
¶39 In his book Rational Dependent Animals, Alasdair MacIntyre argued that 
the development of human beings as practical reasoners, an essential element of 
our identity  as human persons, requires the good of each being pursued in the 
context of the good of all those with whom one exists in relationship:
For we cannot have a practically adequate understanding of our 
own good, of our own flourishing, apart and independently of the 
flourishing of that whole set of social relationships in which we 
have found our place.  Why not?  If I am to flourish to the full 
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95 In Gaudium et Spes,  the Second Vatican Council devoted extensive discussion to marriage and 
the family:
[T]he family is the foundation of society. In it,  the various generations come 
together and help one another to grow wiser and to harmonize personal rights 
with other requirements of social life.  All those, therefore, who exercise 
influence over communities and social groups should work efficiently for the 
welfare of marriage and the family.  Public authority should regard it as a sacred 
duty to promote their authentic nature, to shield public morality, and to favor the 
prosperity of domestic life. . .  . Christians should actively promote the values of 
marriage and the family, both by the example of their own lives and by 
cooperation with other men of good will.
Gadium et Spes, supra note 90, at 226.
96 MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 14 (Harvard, 1996).
extent that is possible for a human being then my whole life has to 
be of a certain kind, one in which I not only engage in and achieve 
some measure of success in the activities of an independent 
practical reasoner. . . . Each of us achieves our good if and insofar 
as others make our good their good by  helping us through periods 
of disability to become ourselves the kind of human being – 
through acquisition and exercise of the virtues – who makes the 
good of others her or his good. . . . To participate in this network of 
relationships of giving and receiving as the virtues require, I have 
to understand that what I may be called upon to give may  be quite 
disproportionate to what I have received and those to whom I may 
be called upon to give may well be those from whom I shall 
receive nothing.97
¶40 But this is an understanding of the good that American jurisprudence, 
rooted as it  is in the philosophical tradition of liberal social contract theory, does 
not, or cannot, embrace.  Martha Nussbaum has argued that although social 
contract theory has been a powerful theoretical tool for promoting the expansion 
of social justice in the Western tradition, it has been unable to solve some key 
problems, such as how to extend justice to the mentally  and physically disabled, 
and how to ensure justice for all the world’s peoples without relying on the 
boundaries and limitations of legal systems and justice principles tied to the 
nation-state.98  What Nussbaum’s inquiry helps reveal is the dramatic effect social 
contract theory’s emphasis on individual autonomy exerts on law and politics:
Doctrines of the social contract  have deep and broad influence in our 
political life.  Images of who we are and why we get together shape our 
thinking about what political principles we should favor and who should 
be involved in their framing.  The common idea that some citizens “pay 
their own way” and others do not, that some are parasitic and others 
“normally productive,” are the offshoots, in the popular imagination, of 
the idea of society as a scheme of cooperation for mutual advantage.99
¶41 The cultural, legal, and political battles over forced heirship in Louisiana 
are indicative of the difficulty  one faces when attempting to promote legal rules 
that rely on obligations that  were not freely chosen, but spring from communal 
relationships or deeply personal understandings of who we are or where we 
belong.  Louisiana’s stable population, unique legal system, and strong Catholic 
traditions meant that philosophical traditions beyond social contract theory 
informed discussions about law and public policy, which allowed forced heirship 
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97 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, RATIONAL DEPENDENT ANIMALS,  107-108 (Chicago: Open Court Press, 
1999).
98 Id.
99 Id.
to remain in place in the legal system until the end of the 20th century.  By that 
time, however, the debates over forced heirship in the academy and in the press 
had begun to demonstrate that the unencumbered individualism of American 
liberalism had become a dominant feature of lives of most Louisianans.
¶42 Until recently, Louisiana existed as a marginal cultural community  within 
the broader culture of the United States.  Strong historical ties to its past allowed 
its legal system to retain a coherent understanding of concepts of ownership  and 
testation that were linked to its cultural and historical past.  But  as Alasdair 
MacIntyre has also noted:
In such communities the need to enter into public debate enforces 
participation in the cultural mélange in the search for a common 
stock of concepts and norms which all may  employ  and to which 
all may appeal.  Consequently, the allegiance of such marginal 
communities to the tradition is constantly in danger of being 
eroded. . . . We have all too many disparate and rival moral 
concepts, in this case rival and disparate concepts of justice, and 
the moral resources of the culture allow us no way of settling the 
issue rationally.100
¶43 It is important to recognize how far outside of the mainstream of American 
testamentary law Louisiana was with the pre-1999 légitime and how far outside 
the mainstream it  remains with respect to the testamentary rights of children.  In 
the other 49 states of the union, a testator has almost unlimited freedom to 
disinherit adult children, and minor children are increasingly subject to 
disinheritance.101   In an eloquent defense of the tradition of the légitime in 
Louisiana, Professor Katherine Shaw Spaht wrote:
Forced heirship, an institution tested through the ages, remains a 
sound social policy  to date because it helps preserve and strengthen 
the family by reminding parents of their societal responsibilities 
and by  binding family members together throughout life and 
beyond. . . . [O]ther states are now beginning to realize that the 
rampant disintegration of the family is not unrelated to legal 
institutions that promoted a selfish individualism by glorifying the 
unrestricted freedom of testation.102
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100 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 252 (2d edition, Notre Dame 1984).
101  Professor Brashier argues that the disinheritance of minor children is a serious and growing 
problem in the United States, particularly given the huge numbers of divorces and non-marital 
births. S ee generally, Brashier, supra note 2, at 9-12.
102  Katherine Shaw Spaht, Forced Heirship Changes: The Regrettable Revolution Completed, 57 
LA. L. REV. 55, 58 (1996).
¶44 In Louisiana, at least until 23 years of age, a child’s right to the légitime 
can be defeated only if there is “just cause” to disinherit.103   Even with the 
changes to the légitime, Louisiana remains the only state in the United States that 
provides children under age 23 with direct  protection from disinheritance.104 
Unfortunately, the new limitations on forced heirship suggest that this 
contribution to American family law may be threatened as Louisiana is absorbed 
into mainstream American cultural thinking about the individual’s responsibilities 
to others.  In an article comparing the American system of inheritance to a model 
in the Canadian province of British Columbia, Ronald Chester asked:
[W]hy does the United States, nearly alone among modern nations, 
allow parents to disinherit  their children?  Although a number of 
reasons, might  be proffered, the answer is most likely to be found 
in Americans’ extreme tolerance for individual control over 
property, even after death.  Neither children nor the family appear 
to be held in high enough esteem to overcome this desire for 
individual control.105
¶45 Although Chester believes that this situation in American law is “bad for 
the family, bad for society, and that it should be remedied,” he prefers the 
common law system of judicial discretion over forced heirship as the best way to 
correct this problem.106  Nevertheless, he has no trouble identifying one source of 
the disinheritance problem as a disturbing individualism that places more value on 
the desires of the dead than the needs of children.107   On the other hand, some 
other recent scholarship in this area argues that American law inappropriately 
favors the traditional family in inheritance, and ignores the new realities of 
modern relationships.  For example, Frances Foster contends that American 
inheritance law is locked in a “family paradigm” that “define[s] people by family 
categories.108  Decedents and their survivors remain first  and foremost spouses, 
parents, children, and siblings rather than individuals with particular human needs 
and circumstances that increasingly defy conventional family norms.”109
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103  See generally, Max Nathan, Jr., The Unheralded ‘New’ Disinherison Rules, 74 TUL. L. REV. 
1027 (2000).
104 Brashier, supra note 2, at 1.
105  Ronald Chester, Disinheritance and the American Child,  1998 UTAH L. REV. 1,  2 (1998); see 
also RALPH BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY 103-105 (Temple 
University 2004).
106 Id. at 3.
107 Id.
108  Frances Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L.  REV. 199, 201 (2001); 
see also Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (1996).
109 Id.
¶46 Foster agrees with most commentators that “donative freedom is the 
principle value of the American system of inheritance,” but she argues that this 
principle is often rejected in practice by judges and juries who impose their 
implicit preference for traditional family relationships when reviewing 
bequests.110  Extended family members, care-givers, and non-related individuals 
who had intimate or close personal relationships with the decedent, tend to be 
excluded from intestacy regimes or are in an extremely  precarious position if a 
will is challenged by traditional blood heirs.111   Foster surveys several ways in 
which the inheritance system might be reformed, but concludes with the 
fundamental idea that the major problem with current law in this area is a family 
paradigm that
is so inflexible, outdated, and culturally biased that it harms all 
touched directly or indirectly by the inheritance system. . . . [B]y 
imposing a single version of “natural” wealth distribution, the 
family paradigm sends a broader message to society that devalues 
ethnic, cultural, and individual differences.112
Although not critical of the family  per se, Foster still rejects the idea that the law 
should give a preferential position to traditional family relationships when dealing 
with inheritance.
¶47 Foster’s criticisms reveal another weakness in the concept of donative 
freedom as it has developed in American law.  The Anglo-American system 
provides room for judicial discretion when a will is challenged.  Interestingly, 
Chester would like this discretion to be expanded to protect children and Foster 
seeks to have it restrained to prevent cultural bias.  In some cases, doctrines such 
as undue influence, mistake, and incompetence can allow judges to override the 
objective intentions of a testator, at least as expressed in writing in a will.  But 
successful use of these doctrines is relatively rare, which is as it should be if the 
legal system is to maintain a coherent policy of relying on objective evidence as 
the best expression of an individual testator’s intentions.  The question must also 
be asked whether ad hoc decision-making by judges to modify a testator’s intent 
is a good idea in these circumstances.  As Foster argues, ad hoc judicial discretion 
often leads to an imposition of the will of the decision-maker, based on his or her 
cultural preferences or prejudices.  As an alternative, the légitime offers a bright 
line default rule typically  imposed statutorily.  Although it  favors direct 
descendants and limits the freely  disposable portion of an estate, it  does not 
prevent a testator from making alternative arrangements with the disposable 
portion, such as inter vivos gifts, nor does it prevent the legislature from 
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111 Id. at 209.
112 Id. at 271-72.
increasing or decreasing the disposable portion as social conditions change or if 
there is a broadly held perception that individuals lack sufficient control over the 
disposal of their estates.
¶48 Depending on one’s opinion, the wide-ranging discretion given to judges 
in American common law is an inherent strength or weakness of the system.  The 
courts tend to respond most quickly to the needs of cultural elites, who are most 
likely to bring lawsuits demanding changes in the traditional view of a legal rule 
(or to resist change when they  feel important interests of theirs are threatened), 
and from whose ranks members of the judiciary  are most often drawn.  As 
America’s wealthy and powerful have become more accepting of non-traditional 
social arrangements, there has been a corresponding pressure on the legal system 
to allow more liberal transfers of wealth through inheritance.113   Indeed, 
America’s elites have worked tirelessly to push poor, working-class, and “middle” 
Americans toward more “enlightened” views regarding individual freedom.  As 
Christopher Lasch noted in The Revolt of the Elites, American professional and 
managerial elites have become obsessed with personal health and welfare for 
individuals, while at the same time seeking to “extend the range of personal 
choices in matters where most people feel the need of solid moral guidelines.”114 
What this cultural climate and brief review of current academic discussions of 
American testamentary law reveal is that the role of the family in American life is 
contested, and it is impossible to craft coherent legal rules when a society  does 
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113 Arguably, the modern American social elite, who are defined more by their wealth than by their 
values,  are well on their way to a complete rejection of some of the most basic traditional 
understandings of marriage and family, even going so far as crafting prenuptial agreements 
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subject to dramatic variations from state to state, which makes such predictions difficult.  See Jill 
Brooke, A Promise to Love, Honor, and Bear No Children, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002 at 1C.
114 CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES 28 (W.W. Norton 1995).
not agree on a shared narrative about the role of fundamental institutions in its 
communal life.115
¶49 It would be dismissive of any  meaningful understanding of human dignity 
to ignore the reality of the breakdown of traditional bonds of kinship in many 
modern societies, particularly  in North America and Europe.  Yet, it is hard to 
imagine a concept more basic to human civilization than the bond between parent 
and child, and as a legal concept, the légitime sets a certain standard for the 
consequences that flow from such an important relationship.  In the typical case, 
parents care for children until adulthood, but the relationship  does not end there. 
As health care improves and life spans increase, more and more people spend a 
significant portion of their adult lives caring for elderly parents. At the same time, 
more elderly people than ever find themselves serving as the primary, or even 
sole, caretakers of their children’s children.  The légitime assumes the kind of 
inter-generational sharing of resources that tends to occur anyway, a sharing that 
often relieves the state of significant social service burdens.
¶50 Exceptions to the principle of forced heirship were created to account for 
instances in which the parent-child bond was likely to have been irretrievably 
broken, and there is nothing to prevent legislatures from modifying those 
exceptions to reflect changing social conditions.  By mandating a forced share of 
a parent’s estate for children, the state removes the courts from the innumerable 
complex issues that tend to surround the death of a parent, except in those cases in 
which the status of an heir is challenged under an exception to the rule.  It also 
eliminates the uncertainty of how judicial discretion might be applied in a given 
case.  Furthermore, by limiting exceptions to the rule to uncommon situations 
requiring a fairly  drastic response, the community is able to acculturate itself to 
the existence of a universally applied legal standard that  assumes strong ties 
between parents and children.
IV. CAN A SOCIALLY SITUATED VIEW OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
SURVIVE IN AN AMERICAN IMPERIUM?
¶51 One key philosophical assumption underlying the American understanding 
of liberal democracy  is that human dignity is grounded largely  in personal 
autonomy, and that the “society is united around a strong commitment to treat 
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115  Alasdair MacIntyre has described aptly the state of moral argument in American culture and 
sheds light on the state of discussions of the family in American society:
It is precisely because there is in our society no established way of deciding 
between [competing] claims that moral argument appears to be necessarily 
interminable.   From our rival conclusions we can argue back to our rival 
premises; but when we do arrive at our premises argument ceases and the 
invocation of one premise against another becomes a matter of pure assertion 
and counter-assertion.
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 8 (2d Edition, Notre Dame, 1984).
people with equal respect.”116  Michael Sandel has described the United States as 
a society in which:
[T]he main motifs of contemporary liberalism – rights as trumps, 
the neutral state, and the unencumbered self – figure with 
increasing prominence in our moral and political culture. . . . Even 
the institutions of marriage and the family are increasingly 
conceived in voluntarist terms, prized less for the human goods 
they make possible than for the autonomous choices they 
express.117
¶52 Charles Taylor has noted further that “irreducibly social goods,” such as 
relationships built on love and trust, cannot be properly understood as 
assemblages of the goods or preferences of individuals, and that attempts to 
reduce these social goods to the sum of the benefits they provide individuals is 
misplaced.118 For Taylor, the good that  a family provides to its members and to 
the society at  large is “undecomposable,” and the benefits of family  extend 
beyond what is provided to individual family  members as each of them perceives 
it because of the creation of a “common understanding:”
Common understandings are undecomposable. This is because . . . 
it is essential to their being what they are that they be not  just for 
you and just for me, but for us.  That we have a common 
understanding presupposes that we have formed a unit, a “we” who 
understand together, which is by  definition analytically 
undecomposable.  If it were, the understanding would not be 
genuinely common.  A relation of friendship is an example of one 
which reposes on a common understanding around this, that our 
friendship  is valuable. . . . Here is another way, then, that a good 
can be social in an irreducible fashion: where it is essential to its 
being a good that its goodness be the object of a common 
understanding.119
¶53 The atomistic liberalism that now dominates so many aspects of American 
life is increasingly incapable of recognizing the value of undecomposable social 
goods.  Respect for individual autonomy in American law means that the state 
cannot insist on the maintenance of any  social or relational good when one 
individual in the relationship  no longer finds it satisfying, nor can it deny the 
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116  Taylor, supra note 1, at 245 (explaining the triumph of the vision of liberalism outlined by 
thinkers such as Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls among the elites in the English-speaking world).
117 Sandel, supra note 96, at 108.
118 Taylor, supra note 1, at 139.
119 Id.
opportunity for individuals to create at-will relationships they believe promote 
their individual well-being.  Catholic theologian David Hollenbach has argued 
that Americans have developed a highly privatized view of the good life which:
Suggests that those aspects of life under the power of personal 
freedom are more important to most Americans than those 
determined by social contexts or historical contingencies. . . . It 
puts the quality  of public life low on the scale of goods and directs 
attention away from goods that can only be realized in the shared 
life of the larger society.  Thus it devalues the common good and 
directs attention away from the common conditions of public 
life.120
But, as Hollenbach later demonstrates through various examples, there are 
“problems tolerance cannot handle.”121
¶54 This privatized, atomized, and tolerant culture has proved a fertile 
breeding ground for an aggressive, consumer-driven version of free market 
capitalism.  It  is hardly  an exaggeration to say that  the United States has become a 
country  devoted to the creeds of consumption and consumerism.122  Much of our 
public discussion is focused on the economy, and many of our major public policy 
choices are cast in market terms.  Increasingly, the United States has become a 
society not of citizens, engaged with one another in the process of democratic 
governance and the pursuit of common goals, but of consumers, bound together in 
their individual, yet similar, quests for economic advancement and material 
acquisition.  In Taylor’s terms, American society draws its unity from convergent 
interests as opposed to common ones, which raises serious questions about the 
long-term integrity of the American societal model in its current form:
[T]he very  definition of a republican regime as classically 
understood requires an ontology different from atomism. . . . It 
requires that we probe the relations of identity and community, and 
distinguish the different possibilities , in particular the possible 
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121 For instance, domestic issues of race, poverty, and social isolation; international issues such as 
AIDS, economic globalization, terrorism. See generally, id. at 32-61.
122 Consumerism names the ethos of the modern market that is at least as inescapable as the state. 
Thus modern persons are increasingly defined in all of our relationships and endeavors as 
consumers.  We are no longer students, but “educational consumers,” no longer worshipers, but 
“church shoppers,” no longer patients, but “health consumers,” and so on.  Some may brush aside 
such labels as “mere language,” but language is crucial to any ethos.  Language makes all the 
difference in how we perceive and define the issues of everyday life, and so how we respond to 
them.  RODNEY CLAPP, ED., THE CONSUMING PASSION 8 (InterVarsity Press 1998).
place of we-identities as against merely  convergent I-identities, and 
the consequent role of common as against convergent goods.123
This inability of American culture to give public value to social goods has had 
harsh effects on families and family life.  It is hardly surprising to find that 
American marriages are often transitory and that American children, too weak to 
promote their own interests, suffer from high rates of poverty.124
¶55 There is a growing concern around the world that  the United States wants 
to promote a global, free-market capitalism grounded in this American political 
and social model, something that many nations find objectively undesirable, 
inefficient, and ultimately destructive of social cohesion.125   For instance, in 
L’Illusion économique [The Economic Illusion], French historian Emmanuel Todd 
wrote a piercing critique of American-style capitalism and cultural atomism.126 
What was particularly interesting in his analysis, and probably most trenchant, 
was a body of anthropological and sociological research he cited to argue that the 
predominate type of family structure in a region can be predictive of the way 
capitalism will develop in that area.127  Todd’s analysis provides a compelling link 
between American family life and the American economic model.
¶56 The attack on the légitime in Louisiana lends some support to the view 
that the concept of a permanent, communal identity  grounded in social institutions 
such as family groups is not a strong social current in American life.  American 
legal rules, economic conditions, political life, and social interactions reflect this 
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124  In 2000, the Centers for Disease Control reported that 43% of first marriages in the United 
States ended in divorce within 15 years, and that divorce is associated with a wide variety of 
negative health outcomes for men, women, and children.  Matthew D. Bramlett & William D. 
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Number 323 (May 31, 2001) available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad323.pdf.  Sixteen 
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CHILDREN 2002: INDICATORS OF CHILDREN’S WELL-BEING,  http://childstats.gov/americaschildren/
index.asp.
125  Gray, supra note 87.  In MICHEL ALBERT, CAPITALISM VS. CAPITALISM: HOW AMERICA’S 
OBSESSION WITH INDIVIDUAL ACHIEVEMENT AND SHORT-TERM PROFIT HAS LED IT TO THE BRINK 
OF COLLAPSE (Paul Haviland trans., Four Wall Eight Widows 1993), Michel Albert organizes the 
triumphant capitalism of the early 1990s into two models: the “neo-American” model based on 
individual success and short term financial gain and the “Rhine” (or German-Japanese) model 
based on collective success, consensus, and long-term vision.  Albert argues for the superiority of 
the Rhine model, which he believes is more efficient and equitable.
126  EMMANUEL TODD, L’ILLUSION ECONOMIQUE (Gallimard 1998).  Todd cites Albert and several 
other European studies of capitalist economies for the proposition that a significant body of 
academic work supports the view that sociological and anthropological research explains various 
“cultures” of capitalism.  Id.  at 71-77.  Todd draws heavily on the role family structures have 
played in the development two fundamental categories of capitalism: Anglo-Saxon “individualist” 
and Germano-Japanese “integrated.”
127 Id.
cultural reality by rewarding individual effort, achievement, and autonomy at the 
expense of weaker community stakeholders like children, whose needs tend to 
constrain individual freedom and choice.128   Individuals who aggressively and 
successfully  pursue financial gain, material wealth, and self-aggrandizement are 
widely  emulated and admired.  But not all societies view these qualities in the 
positive light that Americans do.  As they rush to adapt to the imperatives of the 
global marketplace, developing countries in particular risk being swept up in a 
broader wave of cultural “Americanization” before they have had time to consider 
the broader effects of the process on their ways of life.
¶57 Ultimately, the story  of the légitime in Louisiana reveals certain values in 
American culture that play an important role in the maintenance or reform of key 
legal principles, and it suggests important relationships between the promotion of 
certain types of liberal values in economic and political life and the weakening of 
the bonds of kinship, love, and friendship  in cultural life.  Strong family structures 
do not  serve the interests of a highly mobile, consumer-driven economy or a 
culture governed primarily  by self-referential concepts of personal morality and 
identity.  Weak marriages and loose family commitments fuel the mobility and 
personal detachment that individuals need in an economy that thrives on short-
term profits, materialism, and the unrealistic dream that everyone can become 
rich.  Ties to people are replaced with ties to things, creating a culture that 
ultimately  fails to satisfy real human needs.  On the other hand, people with deep 
family ties or a strong sense of obligation to others often make choices that may 
not be wealth-maximizing in economic terms or particularly self-satisfying in 
personal terms because they place more value on commitments to a common 
understanding of what it means to be a member of a family.  Although these 
choices often come at some cost  to an individual’s personal autonomy, 
maximizing individual choice is not the only way to bring dignity to a human life 
or to build a just society.129
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poor status of American children relative to other groups in the society is not surprising given this 
cultural predisposition.  Sociologist James Coleman argued that since the 19th century, children 
have moved from the center to the periphery of American cultural life, which in part explains the 
growing unwillingness of Americans to provide funding for public schools.  James Coleman,  The 
Family’s Move from Center to Periphery, and its Implications for Schooling,  in THE CENTER: 
IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 27.  Coleman found that approximately two-thirds of 
American adults live in households without children and that interest in children has declined 
dramatically during the 20th century,  particularly as a growing proportion of the nation’s children 
has become non-white.  Id. at 178-79.
129 “Rooted families” tend to be the norm in societies that value production over consumption and 
they form the anthropological and sociological basis of the “integrated capitalism” of Germany 
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¶58 The death of the légitime in Louisiana is a small part of a larger tale about 
an increasingly libertarian American culture and the legal system that has grown 
out of it.  Once one moves away from the rhetoric of personal autonomy, 
government neutrality, and economic liberalism, what does American law and 
culture have to say about beauty, compassion, service, duty, or love?  The 
increasing disengagement of the American individual from any strong 
commitment to communal structures of meaning means that individuals are left to 
define these concepts for themselves, which without some kind of grounding to 
some shared core values, may ultimately make them meaningless on a broader 
societal level.  Meanwhile, the demands of the American free-market economy 
have become ever more brutal, and with the nation’s social fabric stretched thin, 
the consequences of a major economic reversal to the social order become 
frightening to contemplate.
¶59 The family is a place where citizens learn how the bonds that may limit 
the individual in the short-term often provide salvation for the group  in the long 
run.  The nurturing of interdependence within families does not necessarily  force 
the state to define a family in any particular way, nor should it be seen as 
inevitably leading to the repression of individuality  for the sake of a group. 
Reasonable limits on personal freedom in the interest of creating and sustaining 
broader collective goals do not have to be inconsistent with democratic liberalism 
or a respect for personal autonomy, unless of course, one is limited to an 
American model of the liberal state:
A society with strong collective goals can be liberal . . . provided it 
is also capable of respecting diversity, when dealing with those 
who don’t share its common goals; and provided it can offer 
adequate safeguards for fundamental rights.  There will 
undoubtedly be tensions and difficulties in pursuing these 
objectives together, but such a pursuit is not  impossible, and the 
problems are not in principle greater than those encountered by  any 
liberal society that has to combine, for example, liberty and 
equality, or prosperity and justice.130
¶60 When the city of New Orleans was struck by  Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 
the scenes of the city’s poor, sick, and elderly left abandoned without food or 
water for days in the fetid, post-hurricane squalor caused shock and outrage 
worldwide.  Yet, as disturbing as the images from the desolate city were, equally 
appalling to many was the fact that  so many Americans were “surprised” at the 
amount of social distress in inner-city  New Orleans, one of America’s most 
visited tourist attractions.  Yet, New Orleans is hardly  unique among American 
cities in this respect, and an obvious question one might ask is: how could the 
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nation be so ignorant of the plight of so many people in its midst?  On the other 
hand, given the ever-more extreme dissociation people from one another in 
American culture, perhaps a more appropriate query might be: why should anyone 
have been expected to notice?
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